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Justice Antonin Scalia claims that when the Supreme Court invalidated 
Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in United States v. 
Windsor,1 it improperly impugned Congress’s motives. The Court held that 
the statute, which withheld federal recognition from same-sex marriages for 
all purposes throughout the U.S. Code, reflected a “bare congressional 
desire to harm a politically unpopular group.”2 Scalia is right that opposition 
to same-sex marriage is not the same as hatred of gays. 
Yet Scalia’s own methods of statutory interpretation support what the 
Court did in Windsor. If one infers the statute’s purpose from its language 
and interaction with other statutes, with no attention to the legislative 
history or the subjective intentions of the law’s authors, the result the Court 
reached is inescapable. The statute may not precisely reflect a bare desire to 
harm, but it reflects an extreme indifference to the welfare of gay citizens 
that violates equal protection. 
Part I of this Essay describes the debate among the Justices about the 
purpose of DOMA. Part II uses Scalia’s theory of statutory interpretation to 
discern DOMA’s purpose. Part III explains why DOMA, as understood 
through that theory, violates the Equal Protection Clause. The last Part 
concludes. 
I. BARE DESIRE TO HARM? 
DOMA declares, in pertinent part, that the word marriage, wherever it 
appears in the U.S. Code, “means only a legal union between one man and 
one woman as husband and wife.”3 Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, 
held that the law was unconstitutional because it pursued an impermissible 
purpose. “The Constitution’s guarantee of equality ‘must at the very least 
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1
  133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
2
  Id. at 2693 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)). 
3
  Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. 104-199, § 3(a) 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996) (codified at 
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mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group 
cannot’ justify disparate treatment of that group.”4 
How does Kennedy know that such a desire is present? He argued that 
“[t]he history of DOMA’s enactment and its own text demonstrate that 
interference with the equal dignity of same-sex marriages, a dignity 
conferred by the States in the exercise of their sovereign power, was more 
than an incidental effect of the federal statute. It was its essence.”5 He 
concluded that “[t]he avowed purpose and practical effect of the law here in 
question are to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma 
upon all who enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by the 
unquestioned authority of the States.”6 
Justice Scalia had a powerful answer: “to defend traditional marriage is 
not to condemn, demean, or humiliate those who would prefer other 
arrangements.”7 Justice Alito similarly challenged Kennedy’s attempt to 
“cast all those who cling to traditional beliefs about the nature of marriage 
in the role of bigots or superstitious fools.”8 The Act, Scalia argued, “did no 
more than codify an aspect of marriage that had been unquestioned in our 
society for most of its existence—indeed, had been unquestioned in 
virtually all societies for virtually all of human history.”9 Kennedy’s logic 
conflates the desire to harm a group, which is impermissible, with the desire 
to disapprove of certain choices. The equal dignity of gay people is 
constitutionally protected, but it is not necessarily identical with “the equal 
dignity of same-sex marriages.”10 One can disapprove of same-sex sexual 
relations or marriage without despising gay people as such.11 
To see whether Kennedy’s argument can be rehabilitated, we need to 
analyze what it means to discern the purpose of a statute. In this task, we 




  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534). 
5
  Id. 
6
  Id. 
7
  Id. at 2708 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He elaborated the point in his earlier dissent in Romer v. Evans: 
Of course it is our moral heritage that one should not hate any human being or class of human 
beings. But I had thought that one could consider certain conduct reprehensible—murder, for 
example, or polygamy, or cruelty to animals—and could exhibit even “animus” toward such 
conduct. Surely that is the only sort of “animus” at issue here: moral disapproval of homosexual 
conduct . . . . 
517 U.S. 620, 644 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
8
  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2718 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
9
  Id. at 2709 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
10
  Id. at 2693 (majority opinion). 
11
  See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN LAW 
17–19 (2002). 
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II. HOW TO DETERMINE DOMA’S PURPOSE 
A. Discerning Purpose 
Justice Scalia is an original-meaning textualist. He “ascribe[s] to th[e] 
text the meaning that it has borne from its inception, and reject[s] judicial 
speculation about both the drafters’ extratextually derived purposes and the 
desirability of the fair readings’s anticipated consequences.”12 He has 
offered a well-developed account of how to determine legislative purpose.13 
He argues that “discerning the subjective motivation of those enacting the 
statute is, to be honest, almost always an impossible task,” but “it is 
possible to discern the objective ‘purpose’ of a statute (i.e., the public good 
at which its provisions appear to be directed).”14 Scalia states: 
The evidence suggests that [in statutory interpretation], despite frequent 
statements to the contrary, we do not really look for subjective legislative 
intent. We look for a sort of “objectified” intent—the intent that a reasonable 
person would gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the remainder 
of the corpus juris. . . . It is the law that governs, not the intent of the 
lawgiver.15 
Purpose, thus understood, “is to be gathered only from the text itself, 
consistently with the other aspects of its context.”16 “Normally, finding a 
purpose in text is a straightforward matter requiring no feats of subtle 
deduction. Generally the purpose is unmistakable.”17 For example, “[a] 
statute provides that anyone with three or more convictions for DUI must 
have his driver’s license permanently revoked: The purpose is to keep those 
so convicted permanently off the road.”18 Scalia is opposed to 
“purposivism” in interpretation, but only when it relies on a purpose that is 
different from that manifest in the words of the law. “Purpose sheds light 
only on deciding which of various textually permissible meanings should be 
adopted.”19 
This argument is potentially misleading if it is taken to suggest that a 
text can convey meaning when it is read in isolation, with no reference to 
 
12
  ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 
xxvii (2012). 
13
  I am not here endorsing Scalia’s whole theory of interpretation, which has severe flaws. See 
generally Andrew Koppelman, Passive Aggressive: Scalia and Garner on Interpretation, 
41 BOUNDARY 2 (forthcoming 2014) (book review). 
14
  Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
15
  ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States 
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 17 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
16
  SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 12, at 33. 
17
  Id. at 34. 
18
  Id. 
19
  Id. at 57. 
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extratextual, cultural context. Stanley Fish observes that if this is what 
Scalia is claiming, then he exaggerates the autonomy of text. No text can 
tell you what its context is. Without context, a text has no meaning.20 Thus 
Scalia may be read charitably as making the more modest claims that 
legislative history should not be consulted in interpretation, and that 
interpreters should not impose their own notions of sensible legislation onto 
statutes.21 
Scalia sometimes does not even notice how his own knowledge of 
cultural context shapes his reading of texts. Consider the case of interracial 
marriage. In an argument over the protection of abortion in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,22 the plurality opinion 
claimed that Scalia’s narrow reading of the Constitution would permit 
legislation prohibiting interracial marriage. He responded that this “is 
entirely wrong,” because such laws are “contradicted by a text—an Equal 
Protection Clause that explicitly establishes racial equality as a 
constitutional value.”23 The Clause, however, merely declares that “No State 
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws.”24 No explicit mention of race there. So how can Scalia get to the 
result he clearly wants?25 
We all—Scalia included—rely on cultural context to make sense of 
both the Equal Protection Clause and the miscegenation laws. Everyone 
knows that the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted with the specific 
purpose of invalidating laws that imposed unequal legal status on African-
Americans.26 Everyone also knows that the miscegenation laws, along with 
 
20
  See Stanley Fish, Intention and the Canons of Legal Interpretation, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR 
(July 16, 2012, 9:00 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/16/intention-and-the-canons-of-
legal-interpretation. 
21
  Even those claims are dubious. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and Normative 
Canons, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531 (2013) (book review); Koppelman, supra note 13. They, however, do 
not involve the radical error of imagining contextless interpretation. They also are not relevant here. 
DOMA has some pretty nasty legislative history, but it is not necessary to rely upon it to find an equal 
protection violation. 
22
  505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
23
  Id. at 980 n.1 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
24
  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
25
  In a 1990 opinion, he tried to supplement his reading by reference to another text: “In my view 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s requirement of ‘equal protection of the laws,’ combined with the 
Thirteenth Amendment’s abolition of the institution of black slavery, leaves no room for doubt that laws 
treating people differently because of their race are invalid.” Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 
62, 95 n.1 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). But of course the Thirteenth Amendment does not mention race 
either. 
26
  See generally THEODORE BRANTNER WILSON, THE BLACK CODES OF THE SOUTH (1965). A 
purely semantic originalism that ignored this context would be oblivious to all considerations of race: in 
interpreting the meaning of “equal protection of the laws” in the Fourteenth Amendment, we would look 
up each of the words to discern its meaning in 1868, but we would not be allowed to notice that those 
words had anything to do with the mistreatment of the former slaves, since that is not part of their 
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the rest of the regime of racial segregation, were intended to maintain that 
unequal status.27 
In Loving v. Virginia, the Court declared that laws prohibiting 
interracial marriage were “measures designed to maintain White 
Supremacy.”28 It so stated in the teeth of a perfectly innocent alternate 
purpose that had been offered by the state. 
Virginia, in its brief, had cited numerous scientific authorities (since 
debunked) claiming that racial intermarriage tended to produce physically 
defective and socially maladjusted children. It argued that, if the Court were 
to undertake an inquiry into the wisdom of the challenged legislation, “it 
would quickly find itself mired in a veritable Serbonian bog of conflicting 
scientific opinion upon the effects of interracial marriage, and the 
desirability of preventing such alliances, from the physical, biological, 
genetic, anthropological, cultural, psychological and sociological point of 
view.”29 The decision not to allow such marriages, it argued, rested on the 
acceptance of scientific arguments put forth by respectable authorities. If an 
innocent explanation was all that was needed, here it was. Moreover, it is 
nearly certain that at least some of Virginia’s leaders had managed to 
persuade themselves that these scientific claims were true. The appellants 
responded that “there is not a single anthropologist teaching at a major 
university in the United States who subscribes to the theory that Negro–
white matings cause biologically deleterious results,”30 but the Court was 
certainly not competent to adjudicate this dispute. Moreover, even if the law 
rested on bogus science, this would not necessarily have impugned the 
legislators’ motives. Innocent mistakes are not invidious. 
Instead, the Court emphasized that “Virginia’s miscegenation statutes 
rest solely upon distinctions drawn according to race.”31 Such distinctions 
are “odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the 
doctrine of equality.”32 The Court supported its attribution of invidious 
purpose by noting that “Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages 
involving white persons,”33 but it also indicated that Virginia would not be 
able to cure the difficulty by enacting a more broadly worded statute.34 
 
dictionary meaning. See Andrew Koppelman, Originalism, Abortion, and the Thirteenth Amendment, 
112 COLUM. L. REV. 1917, 1924–25 (2012). That obviously is not Scalia’s position. 
27
  See generally Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 
421 (1960). 
28
  388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). 
29
  Brief and Appendix on Behalf of Appellee at 41, Loving, 388 U.S. 1 (No. 395). 
30
  Brief for Appellants at 37, Loving, 388 U.S. 1 (No. 395). 
31
  Loving, 388 U.S. at 11. 
32
  Id. (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)). 
33
  Id. 
34
  Id. at 11 n.11. 
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Why was the Court entitled to make that move? The answer is that the 
Court was aware of the cultural context of miscegenation laws—a context 
in which those laws were inseparable from racist ideology.35 It read the laws 
in light of that context. That justified the attribution of a racist purpose. It 
was the most reasonable reading of the laws’ public meaning. If a law’s 
words “mean what they conveyed to reasonable people at the time they 
were written,”36 then the purpose conveyed by the miscegenation law is 
promoting white supremacy. Alternate readings are available. But in light 
of everything we know about the society in which the laws were enacted, 
they are not believable. Scalia evidently has something like this line of 
reasoning in mind when he concludes that these laws run afoul of the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
Scalia has held that objective reading of statutes can yield an invidious 
purpose that renders a law invalid. In the process, he has revealed his 
unstated willingness to consider cultural context. For example, in Church of 
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,37 the Court struck down 
four ordinances that a city had enacted with the avowed purpose of 
preventing a Santeria church from practicing animal sacrifice. The laws, the 
Court held, violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment 
because their object was the suppression of a religious practice. This 
impermissible purpose was evident on the face of three of the statutes 
because they only prohibited the “sacrifice” of animals as part of a 
“ritual.”38 
Justice Kennedy, who wrote the majority opinion, was able to find 
lurid statements by Hialeah city officials urging the city “not to permit this 
Church to exist” and declaring that Santeria was the worship of “demons” 
and therefore was “an abomination to the Lord.”39 But Kennedy lost his 
majority in the section of the opinion that cited this history; only Justice 
Stevens joined it. The majority held that “suppression of the central element 
of the Santeria worship service was the object of the ordinances,”40 and 
cited the language and operation of the statutes, as well as the fact that 
almost all nonreligious killings of animals were expressly exempted. That 
majority included Scalia. 
 
35
  See Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex 
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 220–34 (1994). 
36
  SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 12, at 16. 
37
  508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
38
  Id. at 527. A more complex line of reasoning, not pertinent here, is necessary to invalidate the 
fourth statute. That same line provides an independent basis for DOMA’s invalidity. See Andrew 
Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA: Why the Defense of Marriage Act Is Unconstitutional, 83 IOWA L. REV. 
1, 31 (1997). 
39
  Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 541–42 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
40
  Id. at 534. 
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If an innocent-sounding explanation will save a statute, even when it is 
part of a legislative scheme that impermissibly targets a group, then this law 
should have been upheld. In oral argument, Scalia flirted with this 
possibility. He suggested that a facially nondiscriminatory law, even one 
that specifically refers to “rituals,” should be upheld as not targeting 
religion because the law would also ban nonreligious ritual killing of 
animals, for example in fraternity initiations.41 Attorney Douglas Laycock 
responded: “If that’s a valid argument, you really have repealed the free 
exercise clause. Any lawyer in the country with that standard of drafting 
can draft an ordinance to get any church that happens to be at crosswise 
with the city council.”42 In the end, Scalia concluded that the Court should 
invalidate “those laws which, though neutral in their terms, through their 
design, construction, or enforcement target the practices of a particular 
religion for discriminatory treatment.”43 Thus he evidently concedes Fish’s 
point that meaning depends on cultural context. 
The last bit of context that matters is not cultural, but textual. Any 
statute is embedded in a larger body of codified law. Scalia has argued that, 
when reading statutes, we should presume that the overall code is coherent 
and reflects a unified set of purposes and that any specific provision is 
enacted with a full understanding of preexisting law. Knowledge of the 
interaction of the new statute with that preexisting law is appropriately 
imputed to the legislature. This canon of interpretation, he concedes, 
counterfactually assumes an implausible legislative knowledge of related 
legislation in the past and an impossible legislative knowledge of related 
legislation yet to be enacted. The canon is, however, based upon a realistic 
assessment of what the legislature ought to have meant. “It rests on two 
sound principles: (1) that the body of the law should make sense, and (2) 
that it is the responsibility of the courts, within the permissible meanings of 
the text, to make it so.”44 Any interaction with other statutes is irrebuttably 
presumed to be intended, a part of the purpose of the statute. 
B. The Purpose of DOMA 
Is the most reasonable reading of DOMA one that attributes an 
invidious purpose to the statute? 
Justice Scalia thinks that the law’s “many perfectly valid—indeed, 
downright boring—justifying rationales” make it hard “to maintain the 
illusion of the Act’s supporters as unhinged members of a wild-eyed lynch 
 
41
  Transcript of Oral Argument at 20–21, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. 520 (No. 91-
948). (Thanks to Professor Laycock for confirming that the questioner was Scalia.) 
42
  Id. at 21. 
43
  Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 557 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment). 
44
  SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 12, at 252. 
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mob.”45 These purposes “give the lie to the Court’s conclusion that only 
those with hateful hearts could have voted ‘aye’ on this Act.”46 Chief Justice 
John Roberts similarly writes: “At least without some more convincing 
evidence that the Act’s principal purpose was to codify malice, and that it 
furthered no legitimate government interests, I would not tar the political 
branches with the brush of bigotry.”47 
Scalia offers two innocent purposes. 
1. Does DOMA Avoid Difficult Choice of Law Issues?—Justice 
Scalia’s most plausible argument is that “DOMA avoids difficult choice-of-
law issues that will now arise absent a uniform federal definition of 
marriage.”48 What happens, he asks, to the marriage of a couple who wed in 
New York and move to Alabama? “DOMA avoided all of this uncertainty 
by specifying which marriages would be recognized for federal purposes.”49 
But federal laws and regulations already deal with those questions, 
which will still arise with underage marriages, cousin marriages, common 
law marriages, and the like.50 Federal agencies have routinely addressed 
these situations for more than a century.51 Scalia does not explain why 
same-sex marriage is any different. 
More important is the question of proportionality. Conflict of laws 
problems are rare. That is why, for a long time, almost no one has noticed 
that federal law is often unclear about which state’s law to apply to 
determine marriage for federal purposes. In a country with thousands of 




  United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2707–08 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
46
  Id. at 2707. 
47
  Id. at 2696 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
48
  Id. at 2708 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
49
  Id. Roberts likewise cites “[i]nterests in uniformity and stability.” Id. at 2696 (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting). 
50
  For example, the Social Security Act states that “[a]n applicant is the wife, husband, widow, or 
widower . . . if the courts of the State in which such insured individual is domiciled . . . would find that 
such applicant and such insured individual were validly married.” 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(A)(i) (2006). 
The Veterans’ Benefits Act directs that “[i]n determining whether or not a person is or was the spouse of 
a veteran, their marriage shall be proven as valid . . . according to the law of the place where the parties 
resided at the time of the marriage or the law of the place where the parties resided when the right to 
benefits accrued.” 38 U.S.C. § 103(c) (2006); see also 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.122(a), 825.800 (2010) 
(defining spouse under Family and Medical Leave Act as “a husband or wife as defined or recognized 
under State law for purposes of marriage in the State where the employee resides”). 
51
  See Brief of Dr. Donna E. Shalala et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 13–29, 
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307) (collecting cases). 
52
  I have been on the lookout for them since I wrote SAME SEX, DIFFERENT STATES: WHEN SAME-
SEX MARRIAGES CROSS STATE LINES (2006). Because same-sex couples’ strongest claims will be based 
on unfair surprise, this is not a kind of test case that can be planned. See Andrew Koppelman, The Limits 
of Strategic Litigation, 17 LAW & SEXUALITY 1 (2008). 
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DOMA’s blunderbuss response was to withhold recognition from all of 
these marriages, even that overwhelming majority in which the couple 
never changes their home, and in which no choice of law problem arises. 
The consequences are far-reaching. Same-sex spouses could not file 
joint tax returns.53 Pretax dollars could not be used to pay for health 
insurance or health care expenses for a same-sex spouse or that spouse’s 
dependent children.54 Same-sex spouses’ debts incurred under divorce 
decrees or separation agreements were dischargeable in bankruptcy.55 
Same-sex spouses of federal employees were excluded from the Federal 
Employees Health Benefits Program,56 the Federal Employees’ Group Life 
Insurance Program,57 and the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act, which 
compensates the widow or widower of an employee killed in the 
performance of duty.58 Same-sex spouses were the only surviving widows 
and widowers who would not have automatic ownership rights in a 
copyrighted work after the author’s death.59 Same-sex spouses were denied 
preferential treatment under immigration law and, therefore, were the only 
legally married spouses of American citizens who faced deportation.60 It is a 
federal crime to assault, kidnap, or kill a member of the immediate family 
of a federal official in order to influence or retaliate against that official—
but it was not if you did that to a same-sex spouse.61 With the end of the 
exclusion of gay people from the military, DOMA made it official policy to 
withhold any survivor’s benefits from the surviving spouse of a soldier 
killed in the line of duty. And so on. 
Once every few years, DOMA may simplify some federal bureaucrat’s 
job. Everyone else is saddled with enormous burdens.62 Thousands of 
employers in states that recognize same-sex marriage must maintain two 
separate administrative regimes for benefits—one that handles federal 
benefits affected by DOMA, and another to comply with state law. 
 
53
  See I.R.C. § 6013(a) (2006). 
54
  See id. §§ 63(a), 106(a); id. § 125 (Supp. 2012). 
55
  See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (2012). 
56
  See 5 U.S.C. §§ 8901–14 (2012). 
57
  See id. §§ 8701–16. 
58
  See id. §§ 8101–93. 
59
  See 17 U.S.C. § 304(a)(C)(ii) (2012); see also Brad A. Greenberg, DOMA’s Ghost and Copyright 
Reversionary Interests, 108 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 102 (2013), http://www.law. 
northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2013/9/LRColl2013n9Greenberg.pdf. 
60
  See, e.g., Julia Preston, Bill Proposes Immigration Rights for Gay Couples, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/03/us/politics/03immig.html; Editorial, Reunite This Family, 
BOSTON GLOBE (Aug. 27, 2007), http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/editorials/ 
articles/2007/08/27/reunite_this_family. 
61
  18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(A) (2012), cited in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694–95 
(2013). 
62
  Burdens on third parties, other than those facially targeted by a statute, are not normally a part of 
equal protection analysis. They are, however, relevant to an assessment of a law’s rationality. Thanks to 
Bob Bennett for helpful conversation on this issue. 
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Mapping the border between those two regimes is so complex that the task 
has begotten a small industry of compliance specialists—expensive 
professionals whose work is a deadweight loss for the American economy. 
A group of 278 employers and organizations, in an amicus brief to the 
Court, explained: 
Some amici have had to pay vendors to reprogram benefits and payroll 
systems, to add coding to reconcile different tax and benefit treatments, to 
reconfigure at every benefit and coverage level, and to revisit all of these 
modifications with every change in tax or ERISA laws for potential DOMA 
impact. . . . Benefits and human resources departments, facing questions from 
employees with same-sex spouses regarding workplace benefit selections and 
coverage, must be adequately trained and prepared to explain the disparate 
treatment to employees who may later realize (perhaps too late) that their 
benefits choices and decisions carried unanticipated and significant financial 
implications.63 
Even large employers can be overwhelmed. Yale University had to tell 
its employees that, because of a programming error, it had failed to 
withhold taxes for the imputed value of health coverage for same-sex 
spouses in 2010, resulting in extra deductions in 2011.64 Because state 
antidiscrimination laws protect many gay employees, the employer must 
determine, at its own risk, where DOMA does and does not supersede state 
law. 
DOMA does not even “eas[e] administrative burdens”65 for 
government actors. For example, it creates fiendishly complex problems for 
bankruptcy courts, which must deal with property rights created by 
marriages recognized under state law (which, of course, DOMA could not 
annul without running afoul of the takings clause) while somehow withhold 
recognition for federal purposes.66 
DOMA deems the interest in nonrecognition of same-sex couples to be 
so overridingly urgent as to justify sacrificing a huge range of other 
government interests, some of the highest order. Bankruptcy courts cannot 
accomplish efficient and predictable adjudication. Government employees 
cannot insure their dependents. The Social Security survivor benefits 
program, “the primary purpose [of which] is to pay benefits in accordance 
 
63
  Brief of 278 Employers and Organizations Representing Employers as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor (Merits Brief) at 28, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307). 
64
  Tara Siegel Bernard, Yale Payroll Error Gives Gay Employees a New Year Surprise, N.Y. TIMES 
BUCKS BLOG (Jan. 11, 2011, 1:45 PM), http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/11/yale-payroll-error-
costs-gay-employees-thousands. 
65
  Brief on the Merits for Respondent the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. House of 
Representatives at 34, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307). 
66
  See Jackie Gardina, The Perfect Storm: Bankruptcy, Choice of Law, and Same-Sex Marriage, 
86 B.U. L. REV. 881 (2006). 
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with the probable needs of the beneficiaries,”67 cannot accomplish this goal. 
Retirees cannot provide for the security of their dependent spouses. Income 
taxation cannot take account of family obligations. National safety itself is 
compromised because the military cannot provide its members’ families 
with health care, housing, and survivorship benefits that are essential to 
military effectiveness.68 
Other conflict of law solutions were available. The most obvious ones 
are those based on the place of celebration or the domicile of the couple 
(which, for many couples, are the same state, so the choice between these 
rules makes no difference).69 Blanket nonrecognition is such an 
extraordinary overreaction that even the Jim Crow South did not adopt it 
with respect to interracial marriage.70 
Scalia had one other argument. 
2. Does DOMA Preserve Prior Legislation?—Justice Scalia also 
argued that DOMA just preserved the intended effects of prior legislation: 
When Congress provided (for example) that a special estate-tax exemption 
would exist for spouses, this exemption reached only opposite-sex spouses—
those being the only sort that were recognized in any State at the time of 
DOMA’s passage. When it became clear that changes in state law might one 
day alter that balance, DOMA’s definitional section was enacted to ensure that 
state-level experimentation did not automatically alter the basic operation of 
federal law, unless and until Congress made the further judgment to do so on 
its own. That is not animus—just stabilizing prudence.71 
This is circular. Just how is “the basic operation of federal law” altered 
when the law recognizes a new set of marriages? That operation changes in 
just the same way—incorporating new couples into the existing structure—
whenever a marriage takes place, regardless of the gender of the spouses. 
3. To Disparage and to Injure.—Note what DOMA does not do. 
Justice Kennedy claimed that Congress’s purpose was “to influence or 
interfere with state sovereign choices.”72 Justice Alito sensibly responded 
that DOMA “does not prevent any State from recognizing same-sex 
marriage or from extending to same-sex couples any right, privilege, 
benefit, or obligation stemming from state law.”73 There is no evidence that 
 
67
  Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 644 (1975) (emphasis omitted) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 
728, at 7 (1939)). 
68
  See Brief of Hon. Lawrence J. Korb et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent Windsor on 
the Merits Question passim, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307). 
69
  See KOPPELMAN, SAME SEX, DIFFERENT STATES, supra note 52, at 82–96. 
70
  See id. at 28–50. 
71
  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2708 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
72
  Id. at 2693 (majority opinion). 
73
  Id. at 2720 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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DOMA has influenced any state’s decision whether to adopt same-sex 
marriage, and it is hard to imagine how it could.74 
But Congress’s helplessness cuts against the law’s reasonableness. 
DOMA is often defended as manifesting moral opposition to same-sex 
marriage—opposition, we have stipulated, that is a constitutionally 
permissible purpose. But that purpose cannot justify a statute that does not 
promote that end in any significant way. The question before Congress was 
not whether same-sex marriages would exist. It was undisputed that 
Congress had no power to answer that question, which is reserved to the 
states.75 The real issue was whether to have a set of second-class marriages, 
denied recognition for all federal purposes, even in contexts in which the 
whole purpose of the federal classification is defeated by not recognizing 
the marriage. 
The creation of such a set of marriages does not do much to serve 
either of Justice Scalia’s enumerated purposes. A law will fail even rational 
basis review if the “purported justifications” make “no sense in light of how 
the [government has] treated other groups similarly situated in relevant 
respects.”76 DOMA does, however, very effectively “tell[] [same-sex] 
couples, and all the world, that their otherwise valid marriages are unworthy 
of federal recognition.”77 
Here we return to cultural context. The most pertinent context is the 
fact that when the law was enacted, gay people were still the objects of 
pervasive and, more importantly, unquestioned prejudice.78 A few years 
before, when newly elected President Bill Clinton tried to end their 
exclusion from the military, the public reaction was so negative that he had 
 
74
  It is unclear from the legislative history whether Congress intended to influence states’ 
deliberations on whether to recognize same-sex marriages. The House Judiciary Committee report says 
repeatedly that each state will remain free to decide this policy issue for itself. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 
104–664, at 24–30 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2928–34. The report also indicates, 
however, that the legislation will provide “assistance” to those states that have no declared public policy 
against recognition of same-sex marriage. See id. at 10 & n.33, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2914. 
75
  That is one reason why Paul Clement’s argument, on behalf of the House Republicans—
nonrecognition is rational because it somehow makes heterosexual couples more likely to marry when 
unexpected pregnancy occurs—makes so little sense that it was ignored even by Justices Scalia and 
Alito. See Brief on the Merits for Respondent the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. House of 
Representatives, supra note 65, at 44–47. Even if this convoluted causal chain is accepted, DOMA does 
not prevent any same-sex marriages from occurring. For the same reason, even if one accepts Alito’s 
view that there is a legitimate moral view that objects to same-sex marriage as such, that premise cannot 
justify DOMA. 
76
  Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366 n.4 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J.; Scalia, 
J., in majority). 
77
  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694. 
78
  See KOPPELMAN, supra note 11, at 21–25; Andrew Koppelman, Romer v. Evans and Invidious 
Intent, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 89, 123–130 (1997). The law also impermissibly discriminates on 
the basis of sex. Andrew Koppelman, Beyond Levels of Scrutiny: Windsor and “Bare Desire to Harm,” 
64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014). 
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to settle for the lousy, and now abandoned, “don’t ask, don’t tell” 
compromise.79 That prejudice is easily inferred from “the text itself, 
consistently with the other aspects of its context.”80 Read in light of the 
entire U.S. Code that it amends and the culture in which it was enacted, the 
law’s central purpose is “to disparage and to injure”81 gay people at every 
opportunity, by any available means, heedless of the cost. 
III. THE EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATION 
A. Extreme Indifference 
The impact on gay people was far from Congress’s mind when the law 
was enacted. DOMA was enacted by huge, veto-proof majorities in 1996,82 
after the Hawaii Supreme Court made it seem likely that that state was 
about to adopt same-sex marriage.83 It was enacted, not to address any 
existing problem, but because Republicans hoped to place Clinton in a 
difficult spot: either ineffectually veto the law, and be branded as favoring 
same-sex marriage (which only a third of Americans then supported), or 
sign it and alienate his gay supporters, in either case hurting his chances of 
reelection.84 He chose the second option85 and was reelected anyway. 
Congress was not thinking about solving a policy problem at all, and it 
certainly was not thinking about the actual human beings whom this law 




  See Andrew Koppelman, Gaze in the Military: A Response to Professor Woodruff, 64 UMKC L. 
REV. 179 (1995) (criticizing “don’t ask, don’t tell”). 
80
  SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 12, at 33. 
81
  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696. 
82
  The bill passed the House by a vote of 342–67 on July 12, 1996. 142 CONG. REC. 17,094 (1996). 
It passed the Senate by a vote of 85–14 on September 10, 1996. 142 CONG. REC. 22,467 (1996). 
83
  See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993) (remanding for trial on whether state can rebut 
presumption of unconstitutionality under strict scrutiny). 
84
  See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH, AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 61–63 (2013). Representative Barney Frank observed at a hearing 
on DOMA that the concern of its sponsors “is not what the States decide to do with regard to marriage; 
they’re worried about how the State decides to allocate its electoral votes, and this is an effort to 
influence not marriage in the States, but whether the Democratic or Republican tickets win.” Defense of 
Marriage Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Comm. on the Judiciary, H.R, 
104th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1996). 
85
  The President signed the bill at 12:50 AM on September 21, 1996. Peter Baker, President Quietly 
Signs Law Aimed at Gay Marriages, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 1996, at A21. 
86
  That lashing out is even more evident in the clumsily drafted choice of law provision, which 
produces no changes in existing laws that are not unconstitutional. See Koppelman, supra note 38, at 
10–24. 
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When DOMA was enacted, there were no same-sex marriages 
recognized under state law.87 Today, on the other hand, there are more than 
130,000 such marriages.88 About half of the U.S. population lives in a 
jurisdiction in which same-sex relationships are legally recognized.89 When 
Congress passed the law, there were no actual people in same-sex marriages 
for the law to hurt and insult. Now there are plenty of them. 
It is imprecise to characterize DOMA as reflecting a bare desire to 
harm a politically unpopular group. The offense against equal protection is 
different. Paul Brest observes that one way in which equal protection can be 
violated is for state actions to reflect “racially selective sympathy and 
indifference,” meaning “the unconscious failure to extend to a minority the 
same recognition of humanity, and hence the same sympathy and care, 
given as a matter of course to one’s own group.”90 John Hart Ely argues that 
in order for legislation to be legitimate, the citizens must all “be represented 
in the sense that their interests are not to be left out of account or valued 
negatively in the lawmaking process.”91 
In DOMA, Congress did not mean to hurt anybody. It was merely 
oblivious. In 1996, otherwise reasonable people thought it a pointless waste 
of taxpayer dollars to look after the basic needs of gay couples and their 
families.92 They also wanted to express moral disapproval of 
 
87
  SARAH TRUMBLE & LANAE ERICKSON HATALSKY, COMMITMENT CAMPAIGN, THIRD WAY, THE 
STATE OF RELATIONSHIP RECOGNITION IN 2013, at 1 (2013), available at http://www.thirdway.org/ 
programs/social_policy_and_politics_program/publications/707. 
88
  On the basis of 2010 census data, the Williams Institute estimates that 131,729 same-sex couples 
in the United States were married under the law of their states. GARY J. GATES & ABIGAIL M. COOKE, 
WILLIAMS INST., UNITED STATES CENSUS SNAPSHOT: 2010, at 1, available at http://williamsinstitute. 
law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Census2010Snapshot-US-v2.pdf. 
89
  TRUMBLE & HATALSKY, supra note 87, at 1. Of these, some are in a city or county that has 
domestic partnerships, with no statewide protections. Id. at 2. 
90
  Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7–8 
(1976). 
91
  JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 223 n.33 (1980). 
The theory of equal respect in decisionmaking that these authors rely upon is elaborated on and 
defended in ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 13–56 (1996), 
and Koppelman, Romer v. Evans and Invidious Intent, supra note 78, at 101–03. 
92
  Some members, of both political parties, offered delusional estimates of the costs. Senator Phil 
Gramm warned that the “failure to pass this bill . . . will create . . . a whole group of new beneficiaries—
no one knows what the number would be—tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands, potentially more—
who will be beneficiaries of newly created survivor benefits under Social Security, Federal retirement 
plans, and military retirement plans.” 142 CONG. REC. S10106 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996). Senator Robert 
Byrd said that he did “not think . . . that it is inconceivable that the costs associated with such a change 
could amount to hundreds of millions of dollars, if not billions—if not billions—of Federal taxpayer 
dollars.” Id. at S10111. As it turns out, the fiscal consideration cuts the other way: federal recognition of 
same-sex marriage would produce a modest increase in federal revenue, amounting to a bit less than 
$400 million annually from 2005 to 2010. See Letter and Report from Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Dir., Cong. 
Budget Office, to Honorable Steve Chabot, Chairman, Subcomm. on the Constitution, Comm. on the 
Judiciary 2 (June 21, 2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ 
ftpdocs/55xx/doc5559/06-21-samesexmarriage.pdf.  
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homosexuality, and the desire to make that symbolic point overwhelmed 
any concern about the concrete consequences of their actions.93 The statute 
reflects the fantasy, unfortunately quite common, that gay people can be 
wished out of existence.94 Aquinas observed that ignorance is not an excuse 
“when somebody chooses not to be informed, in order to find some excuse 
for sin or for not avoiding it,” or “when a person does not actually attend to 
what he could and should consider.”95 
More than any other field of law, criminal law parses out culpable 
states of mind with great precision. One such state of mind is “depraved-
heart murder,” in which the defendant does not intend to kill, but causes 
death when he “engages in conduct which manifests a depraved 
indifference to the value of human life.”96 The Model Penal Code uses more 
precise phrasing, referring to homicide “committed recklessly under 
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human 
life.”97 In such cases, death is caused by “the intentional doing of an 
uncalled-for act in callous disregard of its likely harmful effects on 
others.”98 One element in determining extreme indifference is the social 
utility of the conduct: speeding through crowded streets for the thrill of it is 
a paradigmatic case, while doing that to carry a passenger who needs 
emergency surgery to the hospital may not be a crime at all.99 (That, I will 
shortly show, is relevant to assessing the wildly disproportionate approach 
codified in DOMA.) 
Of course, given Justice Scalia’s method, Congress’s actual state of 
mind is irrelevant to the interpretation of DOMA. The issue is “the original 
meaning of the text, not what the original draftsmen intended.”100 But the 
idea that gay people’s interests have so little weight that the burden 
imposed on them is justified by the trivial interests DOMA promotes is part 
of “what the text would reasonably be understood to mean.”101 It is the law’s 
objective meaning. Given the weakness of the justifications for DOMA, the 
 
93
  Because linguistic meaning is contingent on background assumptions, symbolism can rationalize 
anything. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 69, at 66–68. For many years, the criminalization of homosexual 
sex in the United States was justified on this basis: if the law stopped hunting down gays’ private sex 
acts, it was argued, this would implicitly send a message of approval. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., No 
Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of Antigay Discourse and the Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 
75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327, 1341–44 (2000). 
94
  See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Civil Rights Reform and the Body, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 201, 
209–216 (2012). 
95
  17 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIÆ Ia2Æ, Q. 6, art. 8, at 33 (Blackfriars 1970). 
96
  State v. Crocker, 435 A.2d 58, 62 (Me. 1981). 
97
  MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b) (1981). 
98
  Commonwealth v. Malone, 47 A.2d 445, 449 (Pa. 1946). 
99
  2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 14.4(a), at 439 (2d ed. 2003). 
100
  SCALIA, supra note 15, at 38. 
101
  ANTONIN SCALIA, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW, supra note 15, at 129, 144. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N U N I V E R S I T Y L A W R E V I E W C O L L O Q U Y 
 146 
pertinent legislative purpose was closer to extreme indifference than to 
anything else. 
B. Justice Scalia and Equal Protection 
Does Justice Scalia think that a bare desire to harm a politically 
unpopular group violates equal protection? He has not said so. In the cases 
in which the question arose, Scalia attacked the majority’s minor premise, 
claiming that it had misconstrued the purpose of the law in question.102 
More generally, although Scalia has elaborated at length on the theory of 
interpretation of legal texts—that is what we have relied upon here—it is 
surprisingly difficult to reconstruct his theory of the Equal Protection 
Clause. With the data that exists,103 we can conclude that his theory of 
interpretation is inconsistent with his restrictive view of equal protection 
and that a less restrictive view supports the result in Windsor. 
The core of equal protection, in Scalia’s view, is a ban on racial 
classification: “In my view the Fourteenth Amendment’s requirement of 
‘equal protection of the laws,’ combined with the Thirteenth Amendment’s 
abolition of the institution of black slavery, leaves no room for doubt that 
laws treating people differently because of their race are invalid.”104 Scalia 
would also invalidate facially neutral laws that have a racist purpose.105 On 
the other hand, he does not think that the courts can remedy unconscious 
racism, even if it demonstrably influences life and death decisions.106 He 
 
102
  See supra and infra text accompanying notes 8, 45–46, 48–49, 71, and 121. 
103
  For attempts to comprehensively survey his equal protection jurisprudence, see RICHARD A. 
BRISBIN, JR., JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE CONSERVATIVE REVIVAL 150–80 (1997); RALPH A. 
ROSSUM, ANTONIN SCALIA’S JURISPRUDENCE: TEXT AND TRADITION 157–64 (2006); DAVID A. 
SCHULTZ & CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, THE JURISPRUDENTIAL VISION OF JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 41–
48 (1996). 
104
  Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 95 n.1 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
105
  “A racially discriminatory purpose is always sufficient to subject a law to strict scrutiny, even a 
facially neutral law that makes no mention of race.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 600 (2003) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241–242 (1976). 
106
  This view is made clear in a short unpublished memo circulated during the deliberations in 
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), in which a prisoner challenged his death sentence by citing a 
massive study showing that in Georgia, where the crime occurred, murderers of whites were four times 
as likely to be sentenced to death as murderers of blacks. The Court, in which Scalia joined, rejected the 
challenge, because the prisoner had not shown that “the decisionmakers in his case acted with 
discriminatory purpose.” Id. at 292. Scalia wrote: 
I disagree with the argument that the inferences that can be drawn from the Baldus study are 
weakened by the fact that each jury and each trial is unique, or by the large number of variables at 
issue. And I do not share the view, implicit in the opinion, that an effect of racial factors upon 
sentencing, if it could only be shown by sufficiently strong statistical evidence, would require 
reversal. Since it is my view that the unconscious operation of irrational sympathies and 
antipathies, including racial, upon jury decisions and (hence) prosecutorial decisions is real, 
acknowledged in the decisions of this court, and ineradicable, I cannot honestly say that all I need 
is more proof. 
Memorandum from Justice Antonin Scalia to the Conference, McCleskey v. Kemp (No. 84-6811) (Jan. 6, 
1987), available at http://law.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/McCleskeyKempBasic.pdf 
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also disagrees with the Court’s imposition of heightened scrutiny for sex-
based classifications, and thinks that sex discrimination raises no equal 
protection issue.107 
There may be a limit to his minimalism. He has declared that what 
keeps government action within “reasonable and humane limits” is “the 
Equal Protection Clause, which requires the democratic majority to accept 
for themselves and their loved ones what they impose on you and me.”108 
Perhaps for this reason, “[t]he Equal Protection Clause epitomizes justice 
more than any other provision of the Constitution.”109 On the other hand, he 
has never endorsed any doctrinal device for operationalizing this 
requirement: if equal protection prohibits racial classifications and nothing 
else, then the majority can impose nearly anything it likes on you and me.110 
 
(p. 147). Scalia’s equal protection clause is one in which even racially biased imposition of the death 
penalty is acceptable, so long as it does not overtly or intentionally classify on the basis of race. This 
indifference to unconscious racism is hard to reconcile with any strain of equal protection theory. See 
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 
39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987). Scalia indicated in his memo that he would write separately, but never did 
so, for reasons he later said he could not remember. JOAN BISKUPIC, AMERICAN ORIGINAL: THE LIFE 
AND CONSTITUTION OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 153 (2009). 
107
  See The Originalist, CALIF. LAW. (Jan. 2011), http://www.callawyer.com/clstory.cfm?pubdt= 
201101&eid=913358. 
108
  Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 300 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). Laurence 
Tribe’s amicus brief in Romer quoted this passage. Brief of Laurence H. Tribe et al. as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Respondents at 5, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039). Scalia ignored it. 
I give little weight to Scalia’s joinder of the per curiam opinion in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), 
which held that the Equal Protection Clause guarantees to individuals that their ballots cannot be 
devalued by “later arbitrary and disparate treatment.” Id. at 104. He also wrote separately, and may have 
joined the equal protection holding only because it was important that there be a majority opinion. 
BISKUPIC, supra note 106, at 243. 
109
  Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178 (1989). He 
has expanded on the point: 
Consistency is the very foundation of the rule of law. If you go through our Bill of Rights, I 
daresay it does not contain a single provision that various cultures, in various ages, have not in 
principle rejected . . . . But you will search long and hard to find anyone, in any age, who would 
reject the fundamental principle underlying the equal protection clause: that persons similarly 
situated should be similarly treated—that is to say, the principle that the law must be consistent. 
Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 581, 588 
(1989–90). 
110
  An exception is his approval of Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970), which invalidated the 
centuries-old practice of permitting convicted criminals to reduce their prison sentences by paying fines. 
Scalia argued that no practice with a long historical pedigree could violate due process, and 
distinguished Williams thus: 
The basis of that invalidation was not denial of due process but denial to indigent prisoners of 
equal protection of the laws. The Equal Protection Clause and other provisions of the Constitution, 
unlike the Due Process Clause, are not an explicit invocation of the “law of the land,” and might 
be thought to have some counterhistorical content. 
Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 38 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). The 
general theory of equal protection that entails Williams was not further specified. 
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Scalia is committed to reading the Fourteenth Amendment in 
accordance with its original public meaning. That is why he rejects its 
application to sex discrimination: “Nobody thought it was directed against 
sex discrimination” when the Amendment was enacted.111 But then we must 
apply the same test to the following rule, which is what Scalia’s position 
amounts to in practice: The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits classifications 
and purposive government actions based on race and national origin, and 
that is all that it prohibits. 
At the time of the framing, no one would have understood the 
Amendment to mean that. Equal protection was understood at the time to 
prohibit class legislation—legislation that unjustifiably singled out a 
particular group for special benefits or burdens. The Amendment enacted a 
“doctrine against ‘partial’ or ‘special’ laws, which forbade the state to 
single out any person or group of persons for special benefits or burdens 
without an adequate ‘public purpose’ justification.”112 The Black Codes, 
which did not always formally classify based on race,113 were prime 
examples. Scalia has shown remarkably little interest in any historical 
evidence of the original meaning of the Amendment. There are, of course, 
difficult questions about how to turn these into judicially administrable 
rules. If courts get to evaluate the justification of every law that singles 
someone out for a benefit or burden, then they effectively become another 
house of the legislature. But Scalia has not explored the original meaning 
carefully enough to even encounter those questions. 
An approach to equal protection based on his general theories of 
interpretation would look very different from the approach he actually 
takes. It would have to begin with the original public meaning of the text 
and then attempt somehow to operationalize it. 
Begin with his requirement that people be valued as individuals. 
Before he joined the Court, he argued that affirmative action would 
inevitably produce injustice because it is “based upon concepts of racial 
indebtedness and racial entitlement rather than individual worth and 
 
111
  Bob Egelko, Constitution Does Not Ban Sex Bias, Scalia Says, S.F. CHRON. (Sept. 18, 2010, 
4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Constitution-does-not-ban-sex-bias-Scalia-says-
3252922.php (internal quotation marks omitted). 
112
  MELISSA L. SAUNDERS, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96 MICH. L. 
REV. 245, 247–48 (1997). The idea of class legislation was forgotten in the twentieth century, but it is 
the original meaning. Jack Balkin notes this, in a defense of Windsor, in Windsor and the Constitutional 
Prohibition Against Class Legislation, BALKINIZATION BLOG (June 26, 2013, 1:05 PM), 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/06/windsor-and-constitutional-prohibition.html. Balkin elaborates on 
his historical evidence in LIVING ORIGINALISM 220–55 (2011). For more such evidence, see Steven G. 
Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1, 29–46 (2011). 
113
  See WILSON, supra note 26, at 69–70, 76–79, 97–98, 100–03, 105, 107–11, 113. 
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individual need; that is to say, because it is racist.”114 The core claim is that 
laws should respond to “individual worth and individual need.” 
You cannot respond to individual worth if you regard some people as 
having no worth. You cannot respond to individual need if you think that 
some people’s needs do not matter. Scalia’s logic thus supports the familiar 
conclusion that equal protection prohibits laws based on selective sympathy 
and indifference. That is why the majority must “accept for themselves and 
their loved ones what they impose on you and me.”115 If they must do that, 
then a fortiori a law is not valid if it reflects a bare desire to harm a 
politically unpopular group—or extreme indifference toward a group. The 
Moreno Court was right: “[I]f the constitutional conception of ‘equal 
protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least mean that a 
bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a 
legitimate governmental interest.”116 It must also mean that the legislature 
cannot single a group out for enormous burdens in order to produce an 
insignificant benefit. The notion of class legislation may, as a general 
matter, involve too many discretionary judgments to be appropriately 
administrable by an unelected judiciary, but that is not to say that it imposes 
no limits at all on the legislature. Perhaps the courts should intervene only 
in the rare case where the inadequacy of the justification is flagrant—“a 
classification whose relationship to an asserted goal is so attenuated as to 
render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.”117 DOMA presents such a case. 
Scalia ought to support the major premise of Windsor. 
And, in fact, he never denies it. The “bare desire to harm” formulation 
was used in an earlier gay rights case, and he did not dispute the major 
premise there either. Romer v. Evans struck down an amendment to the 
Colorado constitution—referred to on the ballot as “Amendment 2”—
declaring that neither the state nor any of its subdivisions could prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of “homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, 
conduct, practices or relationships.”118 Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the 
Court observed that the Amendment “has the peculiar property of imposing 
a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named group.”119 The 
Court concluded that, “Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further 
a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else.”120 
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Scalia dissented in Romer. Given his own interpretive method, he 
should not have done that. His dissent is based on a misreading of the law. 
He thought that the law was merely “a modest attempt by seemingly 
tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional sexual mores against the efforts 
of a politically powerful minority to revise those mores through use of the 
laws.”121 Even on the narrow reading of Amendment 2 that Scalia proposed, 
which would have left general guarantees of fair treatment undisturbed and 
prohibited only antidiscrimination protection of gay people, it was only 
gays who were singled out for nonprotection. The amendment left 
undisturbed the protection of heterosexuals against discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation. Scalia neither admitted nor defended this 
singling out of an unpopular group. And we have already seen the weakness 
of his defense of DOMA. 
Romer and Windsor invalidated laws for lacking a rational basis, but 
any statute’s terms suggest a purpose that the statute rationally serves.122 A 
law that bans the driving of blue Volkswagens on Tuesdays is rationally—
indeed, perfectly—related to the purpose of preventing blue Volkswagens 
from being driven on Tuesdays. The real issue is whether some goals are 
impermissible or too costly to be worth pursuing, a question that cannot be 
answered on the basis of “rationality.”123 David Hume famously wrote: 
“’Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to 
the scratching of my finger.”124 But that is not the sense of rationality that 
the Court relies on, or should rely on. Innocent explanations did not save 
the statutes challenged in Loving and Lukumi. 
Return to the analogy with extreme-indifference murder. Authorities 
disagree about whether a defendant can be guilty of extreme indifference if 
he is unaware of the risk of his conduct, for instance if he is “too absent-
minded or to[o] feeble-minded (though not insane) or too drunk to realize 
the seriousness of the risk.”125 The better view is that negligence in such 
cases is not murder. Were one looking for actual legislative intent, it might 
be difficult to impute to DOMA any desire to harm anyone, or even 
conscious disregard of a known risk, because Congress’s mental state was 
not so much depravity of heart as feebleness of mind. Nowhere in the 
legislative history do the law’s proponents evince any awareness of the 
law’s actual human consequences. But, once more, Scalia emphatically 
rejects the “false notion that the purpose of interpretation is to discover 
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intent.”126 As we have already seen, he thinks that courts should irrebuttably 
presume Congress’s awareness of any new law’s effect on existing law. 
That effect, then, must be presumed to be intended. 
Recall that a finding of extreme-indifference murder depends on an 
assessment of the utility of the defendant’s conduct.127 The exact same 
behavior will or will not be criminally negligent depending on the value of 
its object. To trigger liability, it is not necessary that the conduct have no 
value whatsoever. It really can be thrilling to speed down a crowded street, 
and pleasure is not valueless. But anyone who thinks that the pleasure is 
worth it—who endangers others “for his diversion merely”128—manifests a 
“depraved mind, regardless of human life.”129 
Windsor’s conclusion that DOMA is irrational implicitly relies on a 
similar proportionality analysis. That analysis is only a minor theme in 
strict scrutiny, though it has some role: the interest in question has to be a 
truly compelling one. The analysis balances cost and benefit.130 Stephen 
Siegel has shown that cost justification was the original point of strict 
scrutiny, which was later transformed into a device for discerning illicit 
motive.131 That shift was led by John Hart Ely, who thought it inappropriate 
for judges to second-guess legislatures’ policy decisions.132 Ely’s caution 
about judicial policymaking is sensible, and the modern Court evidently 
shares it.133 But deference is not necessarily unlimited. If the benefit is 
trivial by comparison with the cost, then it is appropriate to infer that the 
decision has an improper purpose.134 
DOMA’s purpose is to convey a message of disdain for gay couples, 
with extreme indifference to the human costs. As with the “heart void of 
social duty”135 characteristic of extreme-indifference murder, this takes 
DOMA outside the range of reasonable disagreement. To say that the tiny 
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administrative inconvenience cited by Scalia is sufficient to justify the 
enormous burden on gay couples and their employers is crazy. It is like 
strangling the baby because you cannot decide what to name it. 
CONCLUSION 
Justice Scalia’s idea of objective statutory purpose is useful. The fault, 
in his treatment of gay rights claims, is his inability to grasp the minor 
premise. He persistently fails to confront what the law before him actually 
does.136 
We already saw how he relied on an indefensible reading of the law in 
Romer. In Windsor, by contrast, he attempted no narrowing construction of 
DOMA. Nor could he have, given its plain language. But neither did he say 
a word about the way in which the law actually functions. Had he done so, 
his own canons of interpretation would have precluded him from attributing 
to it a benign purpose. 
Scalia’s most important claim is that Justice Kennedy’s opinion 
unfairly conflates opposition to same-sex marriage with hatred of gay 
people. Here Scalia is right. Opposition to same-sex marriage sometimes 
has nothing to do with devaluation of gays and lesbians. 
For many opponents of same-sex marriage, gay people are marginal to 
their view of the world. Justice Alito nicely summarizes the position: 
“marriage is essentially the solemnizing of a comprehensive, exclusive, 
permanent union that is intrinsically ordered to producing new life, even if 
it does not always do so.”137 Whatever the merits of this notion,138 it is not 
about gay people. It is focused on the value of a certain kind of heterosexual 
union.139 The existence of gay people is a side issue.140 The function of 
marriage law, on this view, is to protect a human good that gay people 
happen to be unable to realize: marriage laws do not discriminate against 
them any more than art museums discriminate against blind people. The 
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Court, Scalia wrote in Romer, should not “verbally disparage[e] as bigotry 
adherence to traditional attitudes.”141 
Scalia is also right that the Court should not “take[] sides in the culture 
wars.”142 Disagreement about the value of same-sex relationships is not 
going to disappear soon. It is fundamentally a disagreement about final ends 
whose value cannot be demonstrated by argument.143 It is as intractable as 
(and, as it happens, largely coextensive with) religious disagreement. The 
Constitution should be agnostic about unresolvable, contested questions of 
ultimate value.144 
But it is not necessary to resolve the ultimate value question in order to 
conclude that DOMA is unconstitutional. Opponents of same-sex marriage 
are entitled to their views. But one can hold those views without believing 
that they justify DOMA’s extraordinary mistreatment of gay couples. 
Scalia’s own interpretive theories help show why such mistreatment 
violates equal protection. 
Congress passed DOMA without ever focusing on its human costs. 
DOMA’s contemporary defenders do not have that excuse. They have a 
weird blind spot. They do not seem to be able to perceive the reality of what 
they are doing. The need to make a symbolic point overwhelms all other 
considerations. That self-indulgent blindness has moral dimensions. The 
notion that you may pursue your goals with no regard at all for the impact 
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